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SCIENCE, RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE, AND ANALOGY 
Andrew P. Porter 
Ian Barbour sees four ways to relate science and religion: (1) conflict, (2) dis-
junction or independence, (3) dialogue, and (4) synthesis or integration. 
David Burrell posits three ways to construe religious language, as (a) univo-
cal, (bl equivocal, or (c) analogous. The paper contends that Barbour's 0) 
and (4) presuppose Burrell's (a), Barbour's (2) presupposes Burrell's (b), 
and Barbour's (3) presupposes Burrell's (c), and it explores some of the 
implications for each alternative. 
Ian Barbour's typology of the four ways to relate science and religion 
consolidated an era of discussion in science and religion.! The four ways 
are (1) conflict, (2) disjunction or independence, (3) dialogue, and (4) 
synthesis or integration. What is less well known is the scholastic typol-
ogy of ways that religious language can function: univocally, analogical-
ly, or just equivocally, "merely" in symbols. One place this typology can 
be found is David Burrell's Knowing the Unknowable God. 2 Burrell's 
typology can be used to explain Barbour's. Conflict and synthesis 
between science and religion presuppose that the terms of the encounter 
are used in the same way; this is necessary if simple agreement or dis-
agreement are to be possible. This is the way of univocation. Pure 
equivocation leads to a disjunction between science and religion: they 
are incapable of even disagreeing with one another, because they are 
about different things. But if at least religious language is analogical, 
dialogue is possible. 
It is natural to name Maimonides as the exemplar of the way of 
equivocation: for Maimonides, God is simply different from us, and one 
cannot reason cavalierly from intra-mundane and human meanings of 
terms to an identical meaning when those terms are used of God. The 
pivotal insight appears when Burrell puts Karl Barth at the same place in 
the spectrum as Maimonides. For Barth, and indeed for most of the 
Neo-Orthodox, science, and especially the new physics of the 20s, had 
little potential for conversation with theology. The origins of the 
Rabbinic and Neo-Kantian / Neo-Orthodox positions are different, 
though not as different as they might seem. For Thomists and at least 
some Protestant spokesmen, religious language is analogical, and dia-
logue is possible between theology and science, but not conflict. Both 
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conflict and synthesis have flourished in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, the 
land of empiricism, with its univocating instincts. It is here that "science 
and religion" have been a problem for each other, sometimes ending in 
reconciliation, sometimes in hostility. 
1. Correlating Burrell al1d Barbour 
One can fairly easily confirm my conjecture that Burrell's typology 
correlates with Barbour's in at least a coincidental way. The first of 
Barbour's categories, conflict, is occupied by scientific materialists and 
biblical literalists. The designation of the latter group gives the correla-
tion away: it is the literal (i. e., univocal) character of their reading of reli-
gious language that creates the conflict. This understanding of religious 
language is shared by their scientific opponents (otherwise it would be 
impossible for them to conduct a disagreement in any interesting way). 
In the second category, independence, the most notable Christian 
examples are indeed the Neo-Orthodox. The diagnostic marks of taking 
science and religion as independent are attribution to them of differing 
methods and differing languages. Here we have dearly Burrell's option 
of taking religious language as equivocal with respect to intra-mundane 
(in particular, scientific) language. Barbour recognizes that the Neo-
Orthodox emphasize transcendence at the expense of immanence, in 
parallel to Burrell's account at this point. Barbour does not to my 
knowledge make much of the Kanhan origins of the Neo-Orthodox posi-
tion; the Neo-Orthodox, for more or less Kantian motives, provide 
approximate, if rough, parallels to Maimonides. 
Barbour finds the third category, dialogue between science and reli-
gion, marked by attention to boundary questions and methodological 
parallels, and to presuppositions and commitments held in common 
between science and religion. He begins with the observation that the 
rise of science was probably motivated by the doctrine of creation, 
which lays the groundwork for contingent and intelligible order in 
nature. More generally, science, on finding order in nature, poses ques-
tions that it cannot answer, but which are inherently religious. One hall-
mark of the way of dialog is that it has no patience with theories of a 
"God of the gaps". To use scholastic terms, any such idea presupposes 
confusion between primary and secondary causation. Secondary causa-
tion is accessible to science, and consists in intra-mundane relations 
between intra-mundane beings and events; primary causation inquires 
after the existence of the world at all. As we know from Heidegger, pri-
mary causation, appearing as the "ontological difference," is all too easi-
ly forgotten. To look for a "God of the gaps" is precisely to obscure the 
distinction of God from the world, and thus to force language used of 
God into the same meanings as language used of the world. It also 
makes it impossible to bring primary causation or anything like the con-
tingency of being into dear focus. 
In the fourth category, synthesis and integration of science and reli-
gion, the largest group we find are natural theologies. In one way or 
another, I would contend that they all use language as univocally as 
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they can. Barbour puts the Thomists here, but with little comment (I 
would disagree, but his assertion has some merit, as we shall see). He 
also concludes his typology with the Process theologians. I think they 
are correctly placed, but it is not clear that they use language simply in a 
univocal way, or not clear without further investigation. Perhaps they 
are an intermediate case. One could only resolve the question by atten-
tion to analogous or univocal usage of specific concepts critical to 
process theology. In any event, and a few hard cases aside, one can 
roughly verify by inspection the coincidence between Burrell's and 
Barbour's typologies. 
By the way, Avery Dulles has found a typology similar to Barbour's, 
in the ways the Christian theologian relates to history in his 
Christological thinking, and there, too, a correlation with Burrell's typol-
ogy is clear.' But this was to be expected; Burrell's typology was intend-
ed to have far broader significance than just questions of science and 
religion. 
2. The task of religious language 
More interesting than the coincidence of the two typologies is the 
underlying theological problem to be solved, and how it shapes the the-
ological approaches of the various thinkers who follow the four ways to 
relate science and religion. Burrell's posing of the problem is succinct 
and helpful. The task is to both distinguish and relate God and the 
world, and in particular, to speak coherently of acts of God in the world. 
The requirement placed on the solution is to not treat the distinction of 
God from the world as like every other distinction we make. If this 
requirement is not met, the distinction of God from the world then sur-
reptitiously becomes another distinction within the world.4 This tenden-
cy has two effects, seemingly quite opposed to one another. In a 
Platonist spirit, it can denigrate the world we know, in favor of another, 
or in favor of God, which "is" in a more real sense. On the other hand, 
forgetting that the distinction we seek is not one within the world, we 
can come to speak of a system that comprehends both God and the 
world, and evacuate the distinction of its original intent. 
For one example of what can happen when religious language 
becomes univocal, Burrell says that Process Theology tends to compre-
hend God and the world in a larger system, evacuating the distinction 
between them. The other conspicuous possibility for univocal language 
is represented by Fundamentalists, in Barbour's first category. They 
express no intent to denigrate the world before God, but an outsider does 
get the impression that such is the import of their theological culture. 
The clean alternative to univocation and anthropomorphic language, 
as Burrell says, is simply and resolutely to assert God to be other than 
the world. Here he names Maimonides and Barth. But, he continues, "it 
takes little reflection to realize that God cannot be that neatly other if we 
are to use the name creator, or if divinity is to be in any way accessible to 
our discourse." The strategy of the Rabbis and the Neo-Orthodox 
would appear to be performatively incoherent, in as much as it under-
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mines its founding assertion any time it speaks of God at all, certainly 
any time it speaks of God as acting in the world. 
Burrell is anticipated and confirmed in Langdon Gilkey's assessment 
of the predicament of theology, in "Cosmology, Ontology, and the 
Travail of Biblical Language,'" where Gilkey makes an eloquent plea for 
analogy in theological language. Gilkey's examples supplement 
Burrell's: Current liberal theology, afraid of a univocal conflict between 
religion and the integrity of the causal continuum of events in the world 
(vital not only to science but more immediately to critical history) sim-
ply abandons the biblical language that expressed faith in acts of God. 
Neo-Orthodox theology, insistent on retaining both biblical language 
and the integrity of the historical causal continuum, does not see that its 
language is analogical, and does not see that unless the analogies can be 
given intelligible and credible meanings, they will collapse into mere 
equivocation. 
"What is needed, then," Burrell continues, "to articulate the distinc-
tion between God and the world in such a way as to respect the reality 
appropriate to each, is a distinction that makes its appearance, as it 
were, within the world as we know it, yet does not express a division 
within that world." Burrell and Thomists at this point move to a distinc-
tion between essence and existence as the key to understanding the con-
cept of an "act of God." I shall not follow them, not because I disagree, 
but because I want to explore other things here. Instead, I would like to 
generalize to the functional properties of the distinction between God 
and the world that are necessary to fulfill the task set for it: it must keep 
God and the world distinct, yet allow human language to transfer mean-
ing across the distinction. The meaning must cross the distinction, with-
out collapsing it, and still carry responsible truth. 
3. The performative force of anaiogicallangllage 
My strategy at this point is to turn to the performative character of 
religious language. The pivotal clue is found in a throw-away remark: 
as David Burrell has it, "As metaphors, ... [some] terms are inherently 
analogous; we use them better the more we realize how using them 
reveals us to ourselves and shapes the self we will become. In short, 
inherently analogous expressions are inescapably performative in char-
acter."1i It is the commissive feature of performative language that leaps 
out first, to use John Searle's classification. Those who oppose or twist 
analogical language in religion strive most to evade the commissive 
implications of such language, seeking instead to treat it as simply 
assertive, and among assertives, often enough, as logically compelling: 
proof. This is natural theology, and such language is intended in a func-
tionally univocal way, whether this is acknowledged or not. But analo-
gy can always be twisted, and it can be twisted in two ways: toward uni-
vocal or toward simply equivocal language. "Taking it literally," as we 
say, it can be rejected in a sense different from its original analogous 
intention. The commissive force of analogy is disavowed. Analogical 
language can also be pushed in the other direction, regarded as "just 
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symbols," i. e., without binding force. The challenge of analogical lan-
guage - its directive force, in Searle's terms, or its kerygma tic force, in the 
language of New Testament theology, is then undermined or even 
overtly repudiated. Taken literally, it can also - and unnoticed - be 
asserted in ways quite alien to its analogical intention. 
Theological language which combines the force of commissives and 
directives is here, as H. Richard Niebuhr calls it, confessional language. 
Analogy is inherently confessional. Niebuhr's remarks on confessional 
language, in the beginning of The Meaning of Revelation/ while directed 
at what he calls "apologetic", attempts to "prove" things about God, are 
applicable in particular to natural theology. 
Light on the performative force of theological language turns attention 
to the motives for choice between univocal, analogous, and merely equiv-
ocallanguage. One turns to univocal language in a desire for certainty, 
for logically coercive proof. Fear of fideism, the irresponsibility of merely 
symbolic language, and of ultimate meaninglessness, militates in the 
direction of univocation. Some can imagine no other way to conceive a 
synthesis of divine transcendence and immanence. Some turn to univo-
cal language to avoid the anxieties of a confessional stance; others, to ana-
logical or equivocal language precisely to safeguard the confessional 
force of theological language. Wanting responsibility in theological lan-
guage, and seeing no other way to it, people turn to univocal language. 
4. Mistaking Analogy for Univocation or Equivocation 
One can apply these connections between analogy and its performa-
tive force to show how the character of religious language is at issue in 
particular thinkers. This is mildly tricky, since virtually all theologians 
use analogical language someplace. Nevertheless, some also treat it as 
univocal or equivocal in dealing with some particular issues. There may 
not be consistent univocators or equivocators, but contrasts do appear in 
dealing with particular issues. There one can find that, where one 
thinker is candidly analogous and confessional, another will lean on a 
relatively univocal meaning of the pivotal terms, in order to make a point 
without confessional commitments. When analogous language is not 
acknowledged as such, it can appear univocal. When its challenge to the 
hearers is dodged, even by the speaker, it can appear merely symbolic 
and equivocal. The details of such inquiry tend to be more complex 
than its general inspiration, but a few examples may help. 
Analogy can be pressured toward univocation. When Barbour puts 
Thomists in his fourth category, it is because they can yield to such pres-
sure, and despite a careful theory of analogy, function in ways that are 
effectively univocal. The "Five Ways" of "proving" the existence of God 
must leap to mind as evidence that Aquinas himself is performatively 
demonstrative at this point. Yet David Burrell unravels their performa-
tive import as not conventional proofs, as natural theology takes them, 
but rather as retrospectives from the point of view of prior faith. They 
are confessional, not apologetic.s Interpreters of analogy tend to fall 
back on a univocal core of analogical meaning in order to secure the 
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ability to calculate with analogy/ and so to reach the required goals of 
natural theology. Indeed, in the traditional reading of St. Thomas, 
Cajetan's interpretation, analogy can serve natural theology, and so 
evade the confessional import of theological claims. Recent Thomistic 
interpretation, with however much regret and affection for Cajetan, 
tends to demur from his reading of Thomas at this point. 
The move contrary to univocation, to declare religious language sim-
ply equivocal, works out better in practice than one might think. There 
are good reasons for Maimonides' (and the Neo-Orthodox) reluctance to 
admit the analogical character of religious language. When it is not 
noticed that the language is analogous, it can almost trivially be subvert-
ed (by both its enemies and its supposed friends) and re-interpreted as 
univocal language. It is in order to prevent this subversion, and so to 
protect the holiness of God, that Maimonides refuses to admit the ana-
logical character of his language, instead calling it simply equivocal, in 
order to emphasize its non-univocal character. Kant's motives are sur-
prisingly similar - in separating speculative and practical reason, he 
intends to protect science and religion from each other. His heirs well 
into the present century have followed his strategy. When the party of 
equivocation takes its own denials seriously, and tries to treat its lan-
guage as if it really were just equivocal and not analogous, what results 
is called fideism. But fideism attempts to evade the responsibility 
entailed in confessional language in a way different from those who take 
religious language as univocal: not because it conceals its own acts of 
faith, but because it refuses to spell out what it is doing in them. 
Univocation takes literally what was a projection into the world of the 
distinction of God from the world. I choose the term "projection" here 
precisely for the analogy to its mathematical senses. We can project a 
three-dimensional object onto a two-dimensional figure, where we can 
also visualize the three-dimensional object directly. We can also project 
a four-dimensional object (which we cannot visualize directly) onto 
three dimensions, and then, with a good artist, again onto a two-dimen-
sional figure. Failure to recognize the figure as a projection leads to total 
misunderstanding. If the projection-analog in theological language is 
not seen, and the language is taken as literal, God is placed on the same 
level as other natures within the world, defined by being different from 
them, because different as ordinary beings are different one from anoth-
er. And taken literally, this language is then no longer available to dis-
tinguish God radically from the world. Trancendence has been lost, and 
divine action appears as a worldly phenomenon, and moreover, as one 
which is incoherent. When an analogy such as this one, from mathemat-
ics, is itself not seen as an analogy to explain analogical language in the-
ology, one could conclude that, just as in projective geometry, one may 
calculate to theological conclusions with the force of logical proof. At 
this point, a theory of analogical language in theology has been made to 
support what is functionally not analogical at all, but univocal at its core. 
The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church remarks, in the article on 
"Analogy," that mistaking analogy for equivocation, symbolism, is less 
hazardous than taking it as univocation, an anthropomorphic conception 
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of God. It is possible to indicate briefly why univocation is so dangerous. 
Robert Sokolowski, in The God of Faith and Reason, lays out guidelines for 
conceiving the Incarnation, guidelines that may be paraphrased to apply 
to any acts of God in the world. If the action of God in the world could 
not take place without a truncation of natural properties and causation, it 
would mean that God was one of those natural phenomena, and his pres-
ence in history and nature would involve a conflict, a need to exclude or 
restrict some part of the world that he acts in. Either God would only 
seem to be active in the world, or he would have to become a new sort of 
being in the world. "These are ways in which the pagans thought the 
gods could take on human form ... "; i. e., more generally, act in the 
world. "The reason the pagans could not conceive of anything like the 
incarnation is that their gods were part of the world, and the union of 
any two natures in the world is bound to be, in some way, unnatural, 
because of the otherness that lets one being be itself only by not being the 
other."l0 Generalizing again to any acts in the world, pagans could not 
conceive of God's action in ways that monotheism does because their 
gods are part of the world. Falling into univocation, however innocently, 
in the end effectively converts biblical monotheism into what is function-
ally closer to nature-worship than to historical-covenantal religion. The 
way this happens is interesting: The first move is made by thinkers who 
would construct a defense of God from science, and so inadvertently con-
vert theological knowledge into scientific reasoning. Critics, accepting 
the univocal character of their language at face value, show that it is inco-
herent or is empirically falsified. The faithful then dig themselves in, 
with an apologetic that appears to deliver the empirical defense of God 
demanded by the critics, but is in fact utterly immune to empirical dis-
confirmation. Worse, it conceals its original character as analogy, and so 
its original confessional commitments are unrecoverable. An account of 
this in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can be found in R. M. 
Burns' The Great Debate on Miracles; from Joseph Glanvill to David HlIme. ll 
(In fairness, I am not sure that Burns would draw from his own argu-
ment the conclusions that I do.) 
5. Unanswered Questions in Analogy-Research 
The chief question that I am aware of for theories of analogy is to 
spell out how analogy can speak responsible truth: how the speaker can 
be held responsible, and how he can hold his hearers responsible. This 
has to be shown in spite of the fact that the performative force of analo-
gous discourse is not any sort of proof, whether inductive or deductive. 
Its performative force is confessional, and its effect is to make both 
speaker and hearer responsible. One may add, that when theology artic-
ulates a historical-covenantal religion, the analogies in its language will 
themselves be based in history. The form of its confessions will then at 
bottom be historical. 
Analogy, practiced within its own inherent limits, is always a way of 
anxiety, because always confessional, never polemical or apologetic. 
Someone speaking in analogies must take responsibility for the claimed 
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analogies, and his respondent is always free not to join him. The princi-
pal analogies are drawn from history, looking from the past to the 
future. Consider only, to be particular, that the monotheistic doctrine of 
providence looks for good in all of life. When non-monotheistic neigh-
bors scoff at the sight of the monotheist in trouble, there is never an easy 
answer to the taunt, "Israel, where now is your God?". It is the desire to 
be able to point to something visible in reply that leads into the tempta-
tions of univocal language. 
Livermore, California 
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